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INCONTINENCE THE CIVIL EFFECTS
THEREOF
By EDWIN W. HADLEY
In ordinary language, incontinence means a lack of personal
restraint, and the dictionaries say that the word is especially ap-
plied to non-restraint in sexual matters. In our legal vocab-
ulary, the word has the latter meaning only, although its use
is not as common as it was in early legal treatises. It is used in
England, appearing in Mew's Digest. Its technical use is still
frequent in the statutes and decisions of North Carolina, where
a false charge of "incontinency" is per se a basis for an action for
defamation by the wronged woman and for an action for a mis-
demeanor by the State.
We are not here interested in the criminal effects of inconti-
nence. Out of illicit sexual relations may arise prosecutions for
rape, seduction, adultery, fornication, incest, sodomy, or bestiality.
The civil effects of incontinence are numerous, and an attempt is
hereby made to group them all in one article, along with a brief
discussion of each one.
A. Incontinence of Unmarried Persons.
1. If a man commits the act with an unmarried woman
through a promise to marry or other trick, the woman had no
action at common law, but today she has a statutory action for
seduction in which substantial damages are recovered.2 Preg-
nancy need not result, but if it does the damages are aggravated.
This action seems fair, so long as the court is careful to keep
the full burden of proof on the plaintiff. The seduction of an
unmarried girl also gives an action for damages to her, parent,
guardian, or other person standing in loco parentis, and this was
true at common law.- This action was originally based on loss
of services, calling for proof rather difficult to falsify, but a
modern tendency allows the lost services to be purely fictitious
and in some states entirely excuses that element. At common
1 Lucas v. Nichols, 52 N. C. 115, 118; State v. Hewlin, 128 N. C. 571, 37
S. E. 952.
f 35 Cyc. 1295.
s 35 Cyc. 1297
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law and under some statutes the parent is allowed the action
totally apart from any element of seduction or trick, the mere
illicit relations with the girl constituting the wrong.4 The ele-
ments of these actions for seduction are set out fully in the
references here given, and the writer has no serious criticism to
make. The possibility, or even probability, of trumped up evi-
dence is not in itself an objection to an action; if it were, in
many of our large cities there would be very few civil actions
allowed.
2. When a man and a woman are engaged to be married,
each has the right to believe that the other has been and will
continue to be chaste and free from incontinence. A failure in
this matter gives the other party a right to avoid the contract,
unless he or she has knowingly forgiven the wrongdoer. It
seems fair for the law to put this implied condition into such a
fiduciary relation as the contract to marry, and the cases are all
in accord.5
3. Under the feudal system, an unmarried female heir was
in the custody of her overlord, who had to approve of her mar-
riage in order to be sure that her husband would render fealty,
and the Lord commonly received pecuniary advantages from
the husband as a bribe for approval. If the female heir should
be guilty of incontinence, the Lord might be unable to arrange
a good marriage, so by such illicit act she was held to be ex-
cluded from her inheritance. If all of the female heirs should
be guilty of incontinence, the inheritance went to the Lord as
though there had been an eschaet.6 This harsh rule did not
apply to a female heir who had once been lawfully married and
widowed, nor did it apply to a male heir, and the whole matter
became obsolete with the collapse of the feudal system.
B. Incontinence of Married Persons.
1. If a married woman and a man other than her husband
hold illicit sexual relations, the husband has a ground for a
divorce action against the wife, and for a civil action for dam-
ages against the other man.7 The latter action, known as one
for "criminal conversation", has been deemed proper since early
4 85 Cyc. 1304.
5 See digests and treatises for numerous cases.
6 Glanville, Book VII, ch. XII, Legal Classic Series, p. 146.
7 30 Corpus Jurls, 1153 et seq.; Arnold v. Wylie, 157 N. E. (Ohio) 571;
43 Ind. 429; 59 Ind. 548; 70 Ind. 519.
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common law, recompensing the wronged husband for loss of
services, consortium and the sole right to the body of his wife
and at the same time discouraging immoral acts which might
result in illegitimate children.
When a husband and another woman were guilty of incon-
tinence, the common law gave the wife a ground for a divorce
action, but took a different view on the matter of criminal con-
versation, and denied the wronged wife an action for damages
against the other woman. A wife was not deemed to have an
exclusive right to the person of her husband, and of course there
could be no danger of his pregnancy. In his first edition, Mr.
Tiffany seems to approve this philosophy 8 Other writers have
strenuously attacked this double standard, and it is submitted
that they are correct in deeming a wife injured civilly by the
sexual defilement of her husband. In this country the weight
of authority now seems to allow the wife an action for damages. 9
In an action by either spouse for criminal conversation with the
other, heavy damages may be assessed, and in states Where puni-
tive damages for a tort are allowed they lie in this action by a
conclusive presumption of malice. A recent case allowed the
plaintiff to prove attorney's fees as an element of punitive dam-
ages,10 a most important case because such fees are not provable
as a part of costs. The mere illicit intercourse constitutes the
wrong, and there need be no evidence of seduction or alienation
of affections.1 1
2. A most imloktant question raised by the incontinence
of a married woman is whether it disqualifies her from her
ordinary right to be appointed administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband. If she is appointed by the will, this
has been held to be no ground of disqualification; but suppos
she is not named and seeks appointment by the court? "A wife's
statutory right to administer upon the estate of her husband can-
not be regarded as absolute, even though the statute imposes no
restrictions or limitations upon the right. Thus, although the
Atatute does not in terms forbid the appointment of a non-resident
8 Tiffany, Domestic Relations, p. 81.
930 Corpus Juris, 1154. 32 Harvard Law Rev. 576; 129 Ind. 581. Several
contrary cases are cited in texts and digests, but most of them are rather
old.
io Oskamp v. Oskanp 152 N. E. (Ohio) 208.
U1 naltrunas V. !aubles, 154 N. E. (Ohio) 747.
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administrator, yet the reason and policy of the law are against
it" 12 Most statutes easily permit of this interpretation, giving
the court a discretion to pass over the widow for any good cause
and appoint the next of kin. In a Pennsylvania case" the court
said that statutes entitling a widow to letters of administration
"contemplate the case of a wife who lives with her husband till
his death, and faithfully performs all her duties", and a wife who
lived with another man in adultery was disqualified by the court.
A number of cases have disqualified the incontinent wife under
this philosophy, where there were both her immorality and con-
tinued desertion. 4 This writer has found no cases disqualifying
a widow for mere incontinence; desertion must also exist.
A Michigan statute disqualifies a wife who, at the moment
of her husband's death, is living with another man under a big-
amous marriage. The Michigan Supreme Court in In re Dett-
man 15 held that an adultery and bigamy which had ceased some
time before the husband's death did not disqualify the wife, aifd
this may be perfectly correct on the ground that the incontinence
had both ceased and been condoned; but the court went on to
say that the statute is exclusive and nothing not exactly des-
cribed therein will disqualify. This language seems too broad,
in the face of the number and antiquity of decisions declaring
that a probate court has an inherent discretion to disqualify be-
yond matters which a statute happens to mention, and a Mich-
igan court should still be able to pass over a widow who has
lived in uncondoned adultery without having made a bigamous
marriage.
is 93 Amer. Dec. 685. note.
1a Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 175, 93 Amer. Dec. 683.
.14 Fleming v. Pelham (1807), 3 Hagg. ecc. 217, 162 Reprint 1136 (wife
had been adulterously absent for 24 years at time of her husband's death);
Conyers v. Kitson, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 556, 162 Reprint 1262 (semble- court
chiefly relied on fact that wife had remarried to a convicted felon); In re
Creed, 6 Jur., N. S., 590; In re Munroe. 161 Cal. 10, 118 Pac. 242, Ann.
Cs. 1913B 1161 (court says wife's depravity was so great as to amount to
lack of integrity, rnd barred her on that ground); Arthur v. Israel, 15
Colo. 147, 22 Am. St. Rep. 381 (court estops wife from attacking void
divorce gotten by her husband, so case may go on ground that she is dis-
qialifed because not the wife of the deceased)Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. St.
34f,7tl. 61& (a very strong caSethe court disqualifying the wife for
mere unjustified desertion, wiout reuiring proof of sexual infidelity al-
though such probably existed). A few statutes give the probable court
dicretion to refuse appointment for immorality. Others do not give thisground, but it is to be noted that in the California case supra of In re
Munre the court held that sufficient immorality might be equal to lack
of integrity, which latter is universal ground for refusing to appoint
one as administrator.
1,5195 Mich. 231, 161 N. W. 836.
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A California case16 refused to disqualify a widow who had
made a bigamous marriage, had an illegitimate child, and at
the time of her husband's death had not seen him for forty
years. The court seems far too strict in limiting -its discretion,
giving- too much power to the language of the statute when
faced by the claim of a widow who had clearly violated every
marital vow and although a wife in name was not such a wife as
was intended to be given preferential rights to administration.
Some digests explain this case on the ground of condonation, or
that the continued desertion was justified; neither of these ele-
ments are at all clear on the facts of the case, although either
would generally be enough to prevent the disqualification for
incontinence.
Does the incontinence and desertion of a husband disqualify him
from being appointed administrator of his wife's estate? A
negative answer is given in Coover's Appeal, 17 where the hus-
band was adulterous, absent, and a fugitive from justice at the
moment of his wife's death. The right of a husband to be ap-
pointed administrator is not made alternative in most statutes.;
it is almost absolute, and much stronger than that of the' wife.18
This rule, born when Man was King, seems unfair today. The
disqualification of a husband in Cooper v. Maddox 9 seems to
rest on a rather definite and mandatory statute.
3. Our last problem is the effect of incontinence of a
.spouse on the right to dower or curtesy. By an English statute, 0
a wife lost her dower if she deserted, lived in continuous adultery,
and was not received back by her husband of his own free will.
16 In re Newman, 124 Cal. 688, 57 Pac. 686, 45 1, R. A. 780.
17 52 Pa. St. 427.
is 23 Corpus Juris 1036.
19 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 135.
g0 13 Edw. I c 34 (1285).
si Dantels v. Taylor, 145 Fed. 169, 7 Ann. Cas. 352 (Arkansas statute.
copied in Indian Terr. But a! later Arkansas statute seems to have re-
pealed this disqualification, it being missing in the Digest of 1921; and see
a dictum in Estes v. Merrill, 12 Ark. 361, 181 S. W. 136, that bigamy wouldjot bar dower). Sistare v. Sistare, 2 Root (Conn.) 468; Kantor v. Bloom,
90 Conn. 210. 96Atl. 974; Rawlins v. Buttel, 6 Del. 224; McGenra v. McGenra,
7 Del. Ch. 432, 44 Atl. 816; Gordon v. Dickison, 131 Ill. 141, 23 N. E. 439
(qtatute bars adulterous husband, also); Owen v. Owen, 57 Ind. 291;
Spade v. Hawkins, 60 Ind. App. 388, 110 N. E. 1010; Ferguson v. Ferguson,
15 i y. 742, 156 S. W. 413; Wilson v. Craig. 175 Mo. 362, 75 S. W 419*
L'yons v. Lyons, 101 Mo. App. 494, 74 S. W. 467; Morello v. Cantalupo, 11i
At. (N. J.) 255; walters v. Jordan, 35 N C. 361, 13 Ird. L. 361, 57 Am.
Dec. 558; Phillips v. Wiseman, 131 N. C. 402, 42 S. E. 861 (statute bare
wife even though she had been deserted by her husband prior to her
adultery); Beaty v. Richardson, 56 S. C. 173, 34 S. E. 73, 46 L. F.
A. 517; Stegil1 v. Stegall, 2 Brock. 256, Fed. Cas. No. 13, 351 (Va. statute);
Harman v. Harman, 124 S. E. (Va.) 273. Particular local statutes should
be consulted.
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This is still law in England, and some American states have
enactments substantially copying the English statute. t Under
these statutes it is almost always required that the adultery be
continuous, and that the desertion be unjusified and still existing-
at the death of the husband. In Kentucky, however, in spite
of a prior decision, it has been held recently that a single act
of adultery without any desertion bars the widow's dower.22
In a few states the English statute has been held to be part of
our American common law.28 In other states the adulterous
wife is not barred from dower, on the ground that dower has been
replaced by a statutory estate and the new statute does not give
adultery as a limit on this estate.24
The discussion of the problem at hand has been confusing
in, most American states because of a conception that this doc-
trine is a creature of statute, and this bar of dower cannot exist
when it is not mentioned in the statute or where there is no
statute. This view appears in 19 Corpus Juris, p. 503, and an
Alabama case 25 says "before the statute of Westminster 2,
(13 Edw. 1) the adultery and elopement of the wife did not bar
her rights". It is submitted that this conception is wholly er-
roneous. In the first place, a statute as early as the year 1285
should be held part of the common law in many states, by their
constitutions or statutes. In the second place, the statute of
Westminster 2nd merely codified a rule previously and firmly
established in the common law. Britton states the rule in
general terms;26 but he requires the three elements of elope-
ment, continued adultery and non-forgiveness, and he wrote
about fifteen years after the statute under the express approval
of Edward I, so he may have been relying on the statute. Glan-
22 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 153 Ky. 742, 156 S. WV. 413.
2 Cogswell V. Tibbetts, 3 N. H. 41; Heslop v. Hesiop, 82 Pa. 537; Bell
v. Nealy, 17 S. C. L. 312, 19 Am. Dec. 686; Henderson v. Chaires, 25Fla. 26 (semble). Wisconsin took this view prior to a statute of 1909.
Chancellor Kent also believed tie English statute to .be part of our cor-
ninn law (4 Kent Comm., p. 53).
"4 Potier v. Barclay, 15 Ala. 439 (semhle); Smith v. Woodworth, 22
Fed. Cas. No. 13, 130, 4 Dill. (Iowa law); Lakin v. Lakin. 2 Allen (Mass.)
45, Littlefleld v. Paul, 69 Me. 527: Pitts v. PItts. 52 i. Y. 593: Rundle v.
Van Inwegan, 9 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 328; Cooper v. Whitney, 3 Hill 95: Rey-
nolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193; Van Cleaf v. Burns, 118 N. '!. 554, 16
Am. St. Rep. 782 (New York followed 13 Edw. I by s statute of 1787, but
changed by a statute of 1830); Bryan v. Batcheller, 6 R. L 543, 78 Am. 454;
Davis v. Davis, 167 Wis. 328, 167 N. W. 819 (stattue of 1909. prior to which
la Edw. I was followed as common law); Nolan v. Nolan, 39 Nova Scotia 380.
25Potier v. BaTclay, 15 Ala. 439, 450. This same historical inaccuracy
appears in many of'the cases cited supra, note 24.
orLegal Classic Series, p. 554.
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ville, however, writing about 1185 A. D., one hundred years be-
fore the statute, remarks in Chap. XVII of Book VI that "if the
wife should, in the lifetime of her husband, be separated from
him on acc6unt of incontinence, the Woman shall not be heard
upon a claim of dower". This seems early enough to allow us
to call the doctrine one of the common law, but we can go back
still further. The Danish law of Canute. who reigned from 1017
to 1035, had not only made, the incontinent wife forfeit her
property rights, but harshly declared that she becamfie infamous
and lost her nose and ears.27. An ancient Saxon decree of Ed-
mund, madi about 943 A: D., ordered the cuckold husband to
do no violence to the wife and to come to a friendly agreement,
whereby the wife should give up property to him ag c6mpensa-
tion and if she had nothing then her nearest relatives should
make amends for her.28 In even earlier kingly and tribal days
it was doubtless common custom, and common sense, that a
wife who had failed in her marital duty should not receive the
marital benefit of property.
It is therefore concluded that the incontinence of a wife,
without more, barred her from dower at the very early common
law, and this is the law followed in the Kentucky case cited
supra, note 22. According to Glanville, both incontinence and
desertion later became necessary, and that became the definite
English law by the statute of Westminster 2nd. This* latter
form of the rule should be accepted as inherited and sensible
common law by those states in which there is effect given to
common law, and no statute should be deemed to dervogate the
rule unless such intention is clear. Where dower has been
abolished and a new type of estate created for a surviving wife,
it is hard to see why such new estate should not be barred by an
adulterous desertion also. The purpose back of such estate is
to provide for a wife who has rendered wifely duties and thereby
lost her chance to secure her" future by embarking in trade. A
wife who has been derelict in her duty, and has voluntarily
looked to a paramour for her future, should not be deemed within
the purpose of the statute. The common sense and fairness of
the old rule was applied to the quasi-inheritance of a wife, and
z7 L1. Canuti, Wilkins.
2s LI. Edm. Ed. Wilkins; Glanville, Legal Classic Series, p. 110.
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should still apply thereto whether her estate is called dower .or
not.
If a husband was guilty of adultery, with or without deser-
tion, this did not bar his estate by the curtesy at common law,
and does not today in the absence of an express statute. 9
"Though the wife's dower is lost by her adultery, no such mis-
conduct on the part of the husband will work a forfeiture of his
curtesy",0 In some states a husband is deprived of any estate
in the property of his deceased wife, by statute, when he has
been guilty of incontinence and desertion, or mere desertion.3 1
It is to be hoped that such a statute will be passed in all states
wherein a wife is barred from dower, as a husband who 'was not
truly acting as such when his wife died should get no benefit
from her property by setting up his husbandship.
29 17 Corpus Juris 434.
s0 4 Kent Comm., p. 34.
si 17 Corpus Juris 434.
